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 POLITICAL CULTURE AND STATE BEHAVIOR: 
 WHY GERMANY CONFOUNDS NEOREALISM 
 
 Abstract 
 
 
 During the past decade, a growing number of scholars have turned to cultural approaches 
to account for the foreign and security policies of states.  Surprisingly, however, these scholars 
have devoted little attention to the concept that boasts the most venerable tradition in the field of 
political science, that of political culture, as a possible source of state behavior.  This neglect is 
unjustified.  Like other cultural variables, political culture promises to explain phenomena that 
are enigmatic from the perspective of leading non-cultural theories, such as neorealism. Yet it 
applies to a broader range of cases than do the many alternative cultural concepts, such as 
strategic culture and organizational culture, that have been employed.  The paper begins by 
describing an important puzzle in the international relations literature that suggests the need to 
consider culture as a variable: the failure of neorealist predictions about German security policy 
after unification.  It then assesses the various cultural approaches to explaining state behavior 
that have been advanced in recent years.  After noting their similarities, the paper discusses the 
important differences that mark them and identifies the reasons for the greater utility of political 
culture.  The final section of the paper illustrates the explanatory power of the political culture 
approach by applying it to the case of German security policy since 1990. 
 
 
 Political Culture and State Behavior: 
 Why Germany Confounds Neorealism 
  
 
 Introduction 
 
 In July 1994, the German constitutional court resolved a longstanding controversy when 
it ruled that the German armed forces could, in principle, participate in the full range of 
collective military actions that might be mounted under U.N. auspices.  In December of that 
year, however, Germany balked when requested by NATO to provide a small number of combat 
aircraft to help enforce the U.N.-authorized flight ban over Bosnia.  To many observers at the 
time, this inaction seemed inconsistent with Germany’s increased relative power status and its 
heightened responsibility for ensuring peace in Europe following unification and the end of the 
cold war.  How then can it best be explained? 
 During the past decade, a growing number of scholars have turned to cultural approaches 
to account for the foreign and security policies of states.  This trend can be attributed in large 
part to dissatisfaction with neorealism and, more generally, the rationalist approaches that had 
assumed prominence in the 1980s and early 1990s.  In particular, a focus on culture promised to 
account for consequential variations in state preferences, which neorealism and rational models 
had typically assumed and often treated as homogenous across states.1 
 As a result of this interest in culture, the literature has witnessed a proliferation of 
specific cultural concepts.  Today, it is not uncommon to see references to strategic culture, 
organizational culture, global or world culture, and political-military culture as well as a number 
of kindred concepts that go by other names.  Surprisingly, however, international relations 
scholars have devoted little attention to the cultural concept that boasts the most venerable 
tradition in the field of political science, that of political culture, as a possible source of state 
                                                 
1Legro 1996. 
  
behavior.2 
 This neglect is unjustified.  Like other cultural variables, political culture promises to 
explain phenomena that are puzzling from the perspective of leading non-cultural theories, such 
as neorealism. Yet it is likely to apply to a broader range of cases than do the alternative cultural 
concepts that have been employed. 
 Accordingly, this paper seeks to remedy the previous neglect of political culture in the 
study of foreign and security policy.  It first suggests the need to consider culture as a variable by 
describing the failure of neorealist predictions about German security policy after unification.  
The paper then assesses the various cultural approaches to explaining state behavior that have 
been advanced in recent years.  After noting their similarities, it discusses the important 
differences that mark them and identifies the reasons for the greater utility of political culture in 
comparison with alternative cultural concepts. 
 The final section of the paper illustrates the explanatory power of the political culture 
approach by applying it to the case of German security policy after unification.  After describing 
the anti-militarist and multilateralist sentiments that have been characteristic of German political 
culture, it shows how these widely-shared attitudes can account for the often otherwise puzzling 
ways in which Germany has acted toward European security institutions, transformed its armed 
forces, and responded to out-of-area crises and conflicts in the 1990s.  A conclusion offers 
suggestions for future research on the relationship between political culture and state behavior. 
 
 A Puzzle for Neorealist Theory: German Security Policy after Unification 
 
 Neorealist theory is one of the leading approaches to the study of international relations.  
                                                 
2Throughout the paper, I will use the term "state behavior" as a short-hand expression for its 
external aspects, especially foreign and national security policy. 
  
Although neorealism is often described as a theory of international outcomes rather than of state 
behavior,3 these two phenomena cannot in fact be so easily separated.  Indeed, variants of 
neorealism have frequently been invoked to explain the foreign and security policies of 
individual states.4 
 As a theory of state behavior, neorealism emphasizes the causal influence of a state’s 
external environment and its position within the international system, especially its relative 
power.  Consequently, it is not surprising that a number of neorealist theorists as well as many 
other observers predicted that German foreign and security policy would change significantly as 
a result of the end of the cold war and German unification.5  The dissolution of the Soviet bloc 
and of the Soviet Union itself had swept away many of the external constraints that had strait 
jacketed German policy during the postwar era, especially the military threat posed by the 
Warsaw Pact and Germany’s consequent security dependence on its Western allies, resulting in 
much greater freedom of action.  At the same time, unification had augmented the Federal 
                                                 
3See especially Waltz 1979, 67-72. 
4Two leading examples are Posen 1984 and Walt 1987.  See also M. Elman 1995 and C. Elman 
1996. 
5I focus on the shortcomings of neorealism in motivating the consideration of cultural 
approaches for the following reason.  Although no one has performed a thorough neorealist 
analysis of the question and, at this point, no one is likely to do so, Mearsheimer (1990), Layne 
(1993), Waltz (1993), and others have made a number of inferences about future German 
behavior on the basis of neorealist premises.  In contrast, scholars have rarely attempted to apply 
explicitly other theories to the subject, and those few attempts that have been made have 
typically addressed only one aspect of German security policy or another (e.g., Anderson and 
Goodman 1993, Crawford 1996, Lantis 1996).  In any case, neorealism, more than most other 
theoretical approaches, promises to account for the broad thrust of German behavior. 
  
Republic's already substantial raw power resources6 and extended its frontiers eastward, thereby 
further enhancing its opportunities for pursuing influence in Europe and beyond, while the 
potential for instability in Eastern Europe and actual conflicts in the Balkans generated 
considerable pressure on Germany to act to ensure its security. 
 In view of these greatly altered geopolitical circumstances, it was only logical for 
neorealists to expect that a profound reorientation of German security policy would follow.  For 
example, Germany's existing alliance ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and the Western European Union (WEU) could have weakened or even been allowed to lapse.7  
Concomitantly, Germany could have lost interest in the continued stationing of foreign troops on 
its soil and might even have actively pressed for their removal.  Instead, Germany might well 
have sought to establish new security relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and former Soviet republics, possibly seeking to draw them into a German-dominated sphere of 
influence.8  And it might have intervened unilaterally in conflicts in the region, reflecting a more 
general willingness to use military force as an instrument of policy.9  To this end, Germany 
might have developed a significant conventional capability for power projection, and it could 
even have tried to acquire nuclear weapons.10  Overall, German security policy might well have 
been characterized by increased unilateralism and assertiveness as Germany once again sought to 
                                                 
6In the short term, of course, Germany's economic strength may actually have decreased, 
especially if one considers indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the 
balance of payments.  See Rittberger 1992. 
7Indeed, Mearsheimer's analysis of Europe after the cold war (1990) is predicated on this 
assumption.  See also Waltz 1993, 76. 
8O'Brien 1992/93, 9. 
9Schwarz 1994, 89. 
10On this last possibility, see Mearsheimer 1990, 36-38; Layne 1993, 37; and Waltz 1993, 66-67. 
  
play the role of a traditional great power. 
 In contrast to such expectations, however, German state behavior has been marked by a 
high degree of moderation and continuity with its record in the postwar era.  Far from setting off 
in adventurist new directions, Germany has exercised considerable restraint and circumspection 
in its external relations since 1990, as discussed in greater detail below.  Above all, it has 
continued to stress cooperative approaches to security involving a high degree of reliance on 
international institutions.  Germany has assiduously sought to maintain its previous alliance ties 
while creating and strengthening other European security frameworks that have promised to 
foster cooperation and stability in the region.  In addition, it has continued to emphasize the use 
of non-military means wherever possible, if not exclusively, to achieve security.  Germany has 
been an outspoken advocate of arms control agreements of all types, and it has done more than 
any other country to promote political and economic reform in the former communist states of 
Central and Eastern Europe.  At the same time, its overall military capabilities have declined 
considerably, and German officials have evinced no interest whatsoever in the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons.  In short, notwithstanding initial fears to the contrary, Germany has acted with 
little more assertiveness and independent-mindedness in the area of national security than it did 
during the cold war.  Indeed, its leaders have expressly forsaken a great power role.   
 To be sure, a few noteworthy departures have occurred in German security policy since 
1990.  Germany's altered international circumstances have necessitated some adjustments.  Most 
conspicuously, the Federal Republic has become increasingly involved in international peace 
missions outside the NATO area.  Nevertheless, most if not all of these changes have been highly 
consistent with Germany's overall approach to security in the postwar era.  Thus few if any 
German actions have provided legitimate grounds for concern, and some developments, such as 
reductions in the German armed forces, have had the effect of making Germany even less 
threatening to its neighbors rather than more so. 
  
 
 Cultural Alternatives, But Which? 
 
 If neorealism is an inadequate guide, how then might one best account for German 
security policy since 1990?  More generally, how might one explain the many similarly puzzling 
instances in which states have not altered their behavior, or have done so only with considerable 
delay, in response to significant shifts in their relative power positions?  Declining powers have 
often been slow to reduce their international commitments and to accept a smaller world role, or 
have even refused to do so until forced by events.  Conversely, rising states have not infrequently 
failed to expand their external involvements in step with increases in their relative national 
power. 
 Perhaps needless to say, scholars have over the years elaborated numerous theoretical 
alternatives to neorealism, involving variables at the system level, the unit level, or both.  Of late, 
however, students of foreign and security policy have frequently turned to the realm of culture in 
the search for explanations to puzzles such as this and, as a result, a plethora of cultural variables 
have been advanced.  Most notable among these have been strategic, organizational, political-
military, and world culture, while numerous kindred concepts, such as beliefs, ideology, norms, 
and national character, have also been employed.11  These seemingly diverse approaches share a 
                                                 
11Relevant works employing the more generic term culture include Chay 1990, Katzenstein 
1996b, Kratochwil and Lapid 1996, and Hudson 1997.  The concept of strategic culture has been 
developed and applied in Snyder 1977, Booth 1979, Gray 1981 and 1986, Klein 1991, Zhang 
1992, Kupchan 1994, and Johnston 1995a and 1995b.  Leading expositions of organizational 
culture have been Legro 1995 and 1996 and Kier 1997.  The concept of political-military culture 
has been used primarily in Berger 1993, 1996, 1997, and 1998.  World or global cultural 
approaches are discussed in Finnemore 1996b and Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996.  On 
  
number of characteristics that collectively distinguish them from materialist theories such as 
neorealism, and, as will be discussed below, they are especially well-suited for explaining 
continuity in state behavior.  At the same time, however, these approaches are characterized by 
important differences concerning the unit of analysis, issue-area relevance, and ideational 
breadth that have thus far gone unremarked.  Because of these differences, some cultural 
approaches, especially political culture, promise to apply to a broader range of cases than do 
others in the study of state behavior. 
 
What Cultural Approaches Have In Common 
 
Defining Characteristics 
 
 Almost every recent application of the concept of culture defines the term differently.  
Despite the absence of a definitional consensus, however, most of the cultural approaches put 
forward by students of international relations have a number of features in common.  Above all, 
they treat culture primarily, if not exclusively, as an ideational phenomenon.12  Whether culture 
is described in terms of assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, concepts, conceptual models, feelings, 
ideas, images, knowledge, meanings, mind-sets, norms, orientations, sentiments, symbols, 
values, world views, or some combination of these concepts, it refers to the recurring patterns of 
mental activity, or the habits of thought, perception, and feeling, that are common to members of 
a particular group. 
                                                                                                                                                             
norms, see Klotz 1995, Finnemore 1996a, Katzenstein 1996a, and Price 1997. 
12In the field of anthropology as well, where the concept first attained prominence, an ideational 
conception of culture has been gaining ground in recent years.  See Elgström 1994, 293, and 
Archer 1996, xi. 
  
 As such, culture needs to be distinguished from at least two other types of phenomena.  
One of these is behavior.  To be sure, a number of conceptualizations of culture have included a 
behavioral component.13  And such definitions are not inherently objectionable.  Nevertheless, 
they do limit the usefulness of culture for explaining state action, which is a primary objective of 
the recent cultural literature.  Consequently, cultural theorists frequently argue that culture 
should be defined and measured independently of behavior.14 
 In addition, culture should be distinguished from formal institutions that exist external to 
human actors.  As Thomas Berger has noted, “Institutions and culture exist in an interdependent 
relationship, each relying upon the other in an ongoing way.”15  Accordingly, some cultural 
theorists have explored the ways in which culture can become institutionalized and the 
consequences of such institutionalization for state behavior.16  While institutionalization may be 
an important mechanism through which culture may work, however, to equate culture with 
institutions risks overlooking the various ways in which the former, as an ideational 
phenomenon, can exert a direct influence on state behavior.  Moreover, cultural and institutional 
imperatives need not always be harmonious but can in fact be at odds with one another.  
Consequently, it is important to maintain the distinction for more than just analytical reasons. 
 Beyond their common ideational basis, conceptions of culture share three other important 
characteristics.  First, culture is viewed as a property of collectivities rather than simply of the 
                                                 
13See, for example, Tucker 1987, Ebel, Taras, and Cochrane 1991, and the discussions of the 
early strategic culture literature in Kupchan 1992, 28, and Johnston 1995a, 5-7. 
14See, for example, Kupchan 1992, 26, and Johnston 1995a, 19. 
15Berger 1998, 11-12. 
16Kupchan 1992, esp. 93-95, and Katzenstein 1996a.  See also Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20-
24, and Jepperson and Swidler 1994, 362-63.  The latter describe institutions as “congealed” 
culture. 
  
individuals that constitute them. The term implies a focus on the beliefs, values, and feelings, to 
use three of the most commonly employed descriptors, that are intersubjectively shared by most 
if not all of the members of a social, political, or organizational unit.  As such, “cultures are 
generally not reducible to individuals,” in contrast to belief systems and other concepts based on 
individual psychology.17 
 Second, cultures are in principle distinctive.  The culture of a group is not likely to be 
identical to that of others, and profound differences may exist from one collectivity to another.18  
This characteristic may be of no concern when one simply seeks to explain state actions that are 
inconsistent with material imperatives and constraints.  But the potential distinctiveness of 
culture may be important for understanding differences in behavior by states similarly situated 
within the material structure of the international system.19 
 Third, cultures are relatively stable, especially in comparison with material conditions.  
Most of the time, culture changes only very slowly, if at all, even in the presence of an evolving 
material environment.  Significant adjustments over short periods usually occur only as a result 
of dramatic events or traumatic experiences, which are typically required to discredit thoroughly 
core beliefs and values, and thus are infrequent.  Consequently, cultures can be quite autonomous 
from, rather than merely a subjective reflection of, external conditions, although the latter 
ultimately place some constraints on the content of the former.20 
 Cultures are resistant to change for a number of reasons.  First, the fact that they are 
                                                 
17Legro 1995, 20.  See also Elkins and Simeon 1979, 123, 129, and 134; Vertzberger 1990, 267; 
Johnston 1995a, ix; Kier 1997,  28; and Berger 1998, 9. 
18Pye 1968, 221, and Elkins and Simeon 1979, 130. 
19See also Berger 1998, 9. 
20Lijphart 1980, 42; Eckstein 1988, 792; Risse-Kappen 1994, 209; Johnston 1995a, 258; Legro 
1995, 22-25; and Berger 1996, 326. 
  
widely shared means that alternative sets of ideas are relatively few and enjoy little support 
within the collectivity, thus limiting the possibility that existing beliefs and values might be 
readily replaced.  Second, some elements, especially normative and emotional components, are 
inherently difficult to disconfirm.21  Third, even potentially falsifiable empirical elements are 
buffered by the psychological phenomenon of consistency seeking.  Information that reinforces 
existing images and beliefs is readily assimilated, while inconsistent data tend to be ignored, 
rejected, or distorted in order to make them compatible with prevailing cognitive structures.22  
Fourth, evidence that irrefutably contradicts reigning world views is rare in international 
relations.23  And to the degree that cultures become institutionalized, they will be even more 
difficult to dislodge, making persistence yet more likely. 
 
The Relationship between Culture and Behavior 
 
 To be useful for purposes of explanation, a cultural theory must also postulate causal 
mechanisms through which culture has an impact on behavior.24  The specific explanatory 
models that have been advanced by cultural theorists, however, are almost as numerous as the 
definitions of culture that they have employed.  Nevertheless, one can identify four general ways, 
distinct from institutionalization, in which cultures can directly influence the collective behavior 
of the groups that hold them.  These pathways correspond to the tasks that are intrinsic to all but 
                                                 
21See also Berger 1998, 15. 
22Cognitive consistency is discussed in Jervis 1976, ch. 4; George 1980, 19-20, 56-57, and 61-
66; Nisbett and Ross 1980, ch. 8; and Shimko 1992, 28-32. 
23Larsen 1994, 25. 
24The importance of identifying causal mechanisms in causal explanations involving ideas is 
stressed in Yee 1996, 83-84. 
  
the simplest decision-making processes, whether or not these tasks are explicitly stated.25 
 First, culture helps to define the basic goals of the collectivity.  From one perspective, a 
group’s culture may be the seat of its social identity, which in turn generates its interests.  Many 
interests “depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity 
of others.”26  Alternatively, one can think of the values embedded within a culture as establishing 
a range of desirable ends that group action might be designed to achieve.  Either way, culture 
may do much to determine the general policy objectives that are to be pursued.27   
 Second, culture shapes perceptions of the external environment.  On the one hand, it 
conditions the range of issues to which attention is devoted by influencing what people notice.  
The general effect is to focus attention selectively, causing some phenomena to be overlooked 
while the importance of others is magnified.  On the other hand, culture influences how those 
features of the surrounding landscape and external events that do register upon people’s minds 
are interpreted and understood.  In other words, it defines the situation, including possible 
challenges to one’s interests and opportunities to pursue them, in which action is to take place.28 
 Third, cultures shape the formulation and identification of the behaviors available for 
                                                 
25Khong (1992, 10 and 20-22) has identified a very similar set of tasks.  Two other instructive 
discussions of the various ways in which beliefs can affect policy making are O. Holsti 1976, 33-
35, and George 1979, 101-104.  It should be stressed that not every cultural theory posits each of 
the following mechanisms, and some may include only one or two. 
26Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 60. 
27Verba 1965, 517; Klein 1991; Kupchan 1992, 6 and 27; Legro 1995, 21; Jepperson, Wendt, and 
Katzenstein 1996, 60-62; and Kier 1997, 5, 21, and 38. 
28Verba 1965, 513 and 516; Rockman 1976, 11; Elkins and Simeon 1979, 128 and 143; Rohrlich 
1987, 66; Vertzberger 1990, 271; Legro 1995, 23; Legro 1996, 133, 122; Katzenstein 1996a, 19; 
and Kier 1997, 28. 
  
advancing or defending the group’s interests in a particular context.  At a deep level, they delimit 
the universe of possibilities for action. Cultures condition the types of options that are seen to 
exist.  As a result, some alternatives may not even be conceived of.29  In addition, cultures define 
the instruments and tactics that are judged acceptable, appropriate, or legitimate within the 
broader set of those that are imaginable, thereby placing further limits on the types of the policies 
that can be proposed, defended, and pursued.30  In any case, certain options, perhaps even a large 
number of them, are excluded from consideration.31 
 Fourth, culture can strongly influence the evaluation of the seemingly available options 
and thus the choices that are made among them.  On the one hand, it conditions understandings 
of the likely outcomes of alternative courses of action.  On the other hand, it shapes assessments 
of the costs and benefits and thus the desirability of the various possible outcomes.32 
 The overall effect of cultures is to predispose collectivities toward certain actions and 
policies rather than others.  Some options will simply not be imagined.  Of those that are 
contemplated, some are more likely to be rejected as inappropriate, ineffective, or 
counterproductive than others.  To be sure, culture is not deterministic.  It may not and often 
does not precisely determine behavior.  But it can significantly narrow the range of actions likely 
                                                 
29Elkins and Simeon 1979, 128; Kupchan 1994, 92 and 94; and Kier 1997, 28. 
30Elkins and Simeon 1979, 131; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 272; Kupchan 1995, 6, 
27, and 90; and Katzenstein 1996a, 19.  A closely related concept is that of national role 
conceptions, which are policy makers' definitions of the actions that are suitable to their state and 
the functions that their state should perform on a continuing basis.  See K. Holsti 1970 and 
Vertzberger 1990, 284-93. 
31Elkins and Simeon 1979, 143; and Johnston 1995a, 35. 
32Vertzberger 1990, 272; Johnston 1995a, 37; and Legro 1996, 133.  See also George 1979, 101 
and 103; George 1980, 45; and Goldstein 1993, 250. 
  
to be adopted in any given set of circumstances.33 
 Going further, one may conclude that culture promotes continuity in behavior. Continuity 
follows from the relative stability of culture.  Even as external circumstances change, decision 
makers may persist in defining problems in traditional ways, or they may continue to favor 
familiar approaches in trying to address new concerns.  Thus culture promises to be particularly 
useful for explaining cases of puzzling or unexpected constancy in foreign and security policy.34 
 
Criticisms of Cultural Approaches 
 
 Attempts to apply cultural concepts to political and other matters have been subjected to 
heavy criticism over the years.35  This is no less true of the recent wave of cultural explanations 
of foreign and security policy.36  Although many of these criticisms warrant attention as 
descriptions of potential pitfalls to be avoided, few if any have revealed intrinsic flaws in the 
concept of culture itself.  Rather, they have primarily concerned the problematic ways in which it 
has often been applied, especially in studies of culture as a determinant of domestic political 
structures and stability.37 
 One early criticism of the concept of political culture addressed the excessively sweeping 
and uncritical manner in which it was sometimes employed to account for patterns of behavior in 
diverse societies.  Consequently, cultural approaches to the study of politics, like the work on 
                                                 
33Rockman 1976, 1-4; Elkins and Simeon 1979, 133 and 139; Eckstein 1988, 790; Vertzberger 
1990, 267; Johnston 1995a, 35; and Johnston 1995b, 42-45. 
34See also Eckstein 1988, 790; Berger 1996, 329; and Berger 1998, 18. 
35For early summaries of the criticisms of political culture, see Kavanagh 1972 and Pye 1973. 
36Desch 1998. 
37Pateman 1971, Rogowski 1974, and Barry 1978. 
  
national character that had preceded them, were accused of ethnocentrism.38  In addition, some 
of the earliest work on the concept was criticized as unduly impressionistic and speculative, 
being based on intuition, reading, and conversation rather than on hard, replicable facts.39 
 These early criticisms were addressed through the increased use of more systematic 
techniques such as sample surveys, quantitative content analysis, and structured interviews.  
These new methods in turn raised questions about their ability to capture and measure such an 
inherently subjective and potentially multi-dimensional phenomenon as culture, especially in the 
context of cross-national comparisons.40  In response, a number of scholars advocated the use of 
more interpretive methods even while taking steps to ensure that their sources were truly 
reflective of the cultures under investigation.41 
 Three other commonly voiced criticisms are that culture is merely a residual category to 
which scholars turn whenever explanations based on more concrete factors fail;42 that cultural 
explanations are rendered tautological through the derivation of inferences about culture from 
behavior;43 and that the use of the term culture may obscure fundamental differences and 
conflicts among the views held by members of the same group.44  Once again, however, these 
                                                 
38Inkeles 1997. 
39Almond and Verba 1963. 
40Pye 1973, 71; Verba 1980, 402-405; and Welch 1993, 43. 
41Rockman 1976; Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman 1978, 8; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 
1981, 33-35; Laitin 1988, 591-93; and Pye 1991, 500-502. 
42Pye 1973, 67; Pye 1991, 504; and Kupchan 1992, 26. 
43Pateman 1971; Kavanagh 1972, 9 and 49; and Barry 1978, 89-92.  See also Almond and Verba 
1963, 50; Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981, 30-31; Kupchan 1992, 26-27; and Berger 
1996, 328. 
44Dirks, Eley, and Ortner 1992, 3, and Brightman 1995, 515-18. 
  
criticisms flow not from inherent limitations in the concept of culture but from the manner in 
which it has been applied.  Scholars need not wait to employ cultural variables until all the other 
possibilities have been exhausted, although the spectacular failure of leading alternatives often 
provides a compelling motive for turning to culture.  Likewise, as suggested above, the danger of 
tautology can be greatly reduced simply be removing behavior from the definition of culture.  
And charges of exaggerated cultural homogeneity can be addressed by disaggregating where 
appropriate the unit in question into relevant subgroups possessing coherent cultures of their 
own. 
 Perhaps the most frequent and serious criticism concerns the difficulty of defining, 
operationalizing, and measuring cultural variables.45  Definitions of political culture in particular 
have been criticized for being fuzzy and lacking in clarity.  The danger of such ambiguity, of 
course, is that a wide range of behavior may be construed as consistent with a particular culture.  
As a result, cultural explanations may be difficult to test and disconfirm.46  It is not clear, 
however, whether this difficulty is necessarily any more characteristic of culture than it is of 
other commonly used concepts, such as power.47  And as a recent critic of cultural approaches 
ultimately concedes, “[t]he definitional problem, however, is largely one of application rather 
than principle, because it is possible to clearly define and operationalize culture.”48 
 
Choosing Among Cultural Approaches: Why Political Culture Is Likely to Be Most Useful 
 
 The biggest challenge facing those who would employ cultural variables to explain state 
                                                 
45Kupchan 1992, 26; Rosen 1995, 13-14; and Desch 1998, 150-52. 
46Pye 1973, 67-68; Rogowski 1973, 13; and Inkeles 1997, viii. 
47On power, see, for example, Wohlforth 1993, ch. 1. 
48Desch 1998, 152 (emphasis added). 
  
behavior, then, may not be that of defending culture against its critics but that of choosing from 
among the many cultural approaches available.  In this section, I argue that political culture is 
likely to apply to a broader range of cases and thus represents a more useful starting point in the 
analysis of foreign and security policy than do other cultural concepts.  The term political culture 
has been used to denote the subjective orientations toward and assumptions about the political 
world that characterize the members of a particular society and that guide and inform their 
political behavior.  Scholars have distinguished three basic components of political culture: the 
cognitive, which includes empirical and causal beliefs; the evaluative, which consists of values, 
norms, and moral judgments; and the expressive or affective, which encompasses emotional 
attachments, patterns of identity and loyalty, and feelings of affinity, aversion, or indifference.49 
 In order to establish the advantages of beginning with a focus on political culture in the 
study of state behavior, it is helpful to recognize that cultural concepts may differ in at least three 
respects.  One is the nature of the culture-bearing unit.  Another is the breadth of the issue-areas 
to which a particular concept applies.  And a third is the comprehensiveness of the concept’s 
ideational content, that is, the range of beliefs, values, and feelings that it embraces.  Only when 
political culture is evaluated against alternative cultural approaches using these distinctions does 
its greater applicability become clear. 
 
Units of Analysis 
 
 Existing cultural theories encompass a wide range of culture-bearing units.  At one 
extreme are global and world cultural approaches in which the relevant unit of analysis is global 
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society.  These approaches promise to be especially useful for explaining common patterns and 
trends in state behavior (as well as state structures), since global culture can be hypothesized as 
having a homogenizing effect.50  Their principal limitation is that they are unable to account for 
variations across states, which are, perhaps needless to say, quite common and often at the center 
of comparative studies of state behavior. 
 At the other end of the spectrum are approaches that emphasize the cultures of small 
groups and other units within states.51  The most frequently employed of these in studies of 
foreign and security policy is organizational culture.  As these studies have shown, 
organizational culture can have an important influence on certain policies and actions.  As a 
general rule, however, this approach promises to be useful for explaining external state behavior 
in only a very limited set of circumstances.52 
 In the first place, few governmental organizations may possess a well-defined culture that 
clearly sets them apart them from other elements of the bureaucracy or even the society at large.  
The empirical work on the subject to date has focused on military organizations, which by their 
highly regimented and often isolated natures are those bureaucracies most likely to be 
characterized by distinct cultures. 
 Second, only rarely will a single organization be in a position to exert decisive influence 
over national policy making.  More likely, its preferences will be but one of a variety of inputs 
into the policy process.  A specific organizational culture, moreover, will typically be of 
relevance to only certain aspects of foreign and security policy, primarily those in the 
formulation or execution of which the organization concerned plays a formal role.  In fact, 
previous applications of the concept to issues such as military doctrine and wartime decisions 
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about the use of particular weapons constitute most likely cases for the influence of 
organizational culture, given that the interests of the military were heavily involved, the military 
had a near monopoly on expertise, and little time was available for decision making.53 
 Much more often than not, the impact of organizational culture will be highly mediated 
by other unit-level factors such as the structure of the decision making process, the domestic 
distribution of power, and the broader political culture of society.54  Thus even where 
organizational cultures exist, it is necessary in most cases to integrate them into more complex 
models that include additional domestic-level variables in order to explain state behavior.  This 
need is only reinforced by the observation that recent studies of organizational culture have 
actually focused on the subunits of military organizations, thereby further compounding the 
problem of aggregating unit preferences.55 
 Accordingly, the most promising place to begin the search for cultural sources of state 
behavior, especially its broad patterns and trends, is at the level of the society represented by the 
state.  Arguably, foreign and security policy, more than other issue-areas, “involve shared 
national beliefs and values rather than particularistic interests.”56  Even this more restrictive 
focus, however, leaves several competing conceptual candidates from which to choose, including 
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54Kier 1997. 
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characterized by several cultures that compete for dominance or cooperate, which gives the 
organization a multifaceted character” (Legro 1995, 20).  For example, Kier (1997, 138ff) 
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British armed forces. 
56Vertzberger 1990, 272. 
  
national character, political culture, political-military culture, and strategic culture. 
  
Issue-areas and Ideational Content 
 
 In order to narrow the field yet further, therefore, it is necessary to consider the range of 
issues to which each approach applies and the comprehensiveness of its ideational content.  
When this is done, one finds that the remaining alternatives to the political culture approach are 
either too broad or unduly confining.  On the one hand, national character, which is the most 
general of the cultural concepts at the societal level, is excessively expansive.  National character 
has been defined as “any internal psychological qualities of a nation which are relatively 
enduring and which may serve to distinguish that nation from others.”57  As such, it includes 
many elements that are of little or no relevance to political life.  In addition, as Lucian Pye has 
pointed out, the national character approach has failed “to recognize that the political sphere 
constitutes a distinct subculture with its own rules of conduct and its distinct processes of 
socialization.”58  Not surprisingly, it has found little application within the field of political 
science. 
 Other societal-level cultural concepts, on the other hand, are unduly narrow in scope and 
applicability.  Although it does not use the term culture, a kindred approach is to be found in the 
burgeoning democratic peace literature, especially the strand that emphasizes the impact of 
liberal values, norms, and ideologies on state behavior.59  This approach has proven useful for 
explaining why liberal democracies do not fight one another.  It is far too limited in the range of 
variables that it considers, however, to serve as a more general theory of state behavior.  Indeed, 
it cannot even account for the many ways in which the foreign and security policies of liberal 
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59For an overview of the literature, see Owen 1994. 
  
democracies may differ from one another. 
 The concepts most closely related to political culture are those of strategic culture and 
political-military culture.60    These concepts have considerable applicability, and of the many 
cultural approaches, that of strategic culture has perhaps been the most frequently employed in 
the study of foreign and security policy.  Nevertheless, even these alternatives lack the utility of 
political culture, for two main reasons.  First, they have usually been defined in such a way as to 
preclude their application to the full range of aspects of state behavior that may be of interest.  
The original definitions of strategic culture concerned military strategy, especially nuclear 
strategy, and the use of force.61  Although Iain Johnston has advanced a more general conception 
that relates to a state’s grand strategy, other recent applications have continued to employ much 
narrower interpretations.62  Of perhaps somewhat broader applicability is the concept of 
political-military culture.  Yet it, too, might be inadequate for understanding important elements 
of foreign policy, given its explicit focus on matters of defense, security, and the military.63 
 A second reason is the limited ideational content of strategic culture.  Recent definitions 
of the concept have typically been confined to the cognitive aspects of culture, omitting the 
normative and affective components that can also have a significant influence on state behavior.  
For Johnston, the central paradigm of a strategic culture “consists of basic assumptions about the 
orderliness of the strategic environment,” which he also describes as a “system of symbols.”64  
Charles Kupchan restricts the term to refer only to the images and symbols that shape how a 
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polity conceives of the relationship between empire and national security.65  Such definitions 
unnecessarily truncate the range of potential causal mechanisms through which strategic culture 
can exert influence. 
 
Conditions Under Which the Political Culture Approach Is Likely to Apply 
 
 In sum, political culture is the most promising starting point for the cultural analysis of 
state behavior.  It subsumes most alternative societal-level cultural constructs, such as strategic 
culture and political-military culture, while remaining focused on political phenomena, in 
contrast to national character.66  Political culture is likely to have the greatest impact on policy 
under two conditions.  First, its influence will be particular strong when the international setting 
is characterized by relatively high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity.  In such 
circumstances, the problems a state faces are less clear, and the objective costs and benefits of 
different courses of action are less obvious.67  As a result, decision makers can or must more 
readily fall back on their pre-existing world views and notions of the consequences of alternative 
policies. 
 Political culture will also figure more importantly as an explanation when national policy 
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is not the exclusive province of only one person or a very small number of decision makers.68  
This condition is more closely approximated in representative democracies than in dictatorships 
or oligarchies.  It is also more likely to obtain if one considers broad patterns and trends in policy 
rather than specific actions decided hastily and under conditions of high secrecy, such as in 
wartime. 
 Despite its potential usefulness, however, political culture is not likely to be an 
explanatory panacea, even when these two conditions are met.  Its ability to account for state 
behavior may still be highly limited in some circumstances.  One reason is that political culture 
may be vague or incomplete.  Consequently, it may offer little or no guidance on certain issues 
or aspects of policy,69  In addition, political culture may be internally inconsistent. As a result, it 
may offer conflicting diagnoses and prescriptions and thus push policy simultaneously in 
different directions.70 
 Finally, the concept may be of little use if there is no single dominant political culture 
within a given state.  In some cases, societies are divided into groups with competing political 
subcultures.71  Thus policy may vary significantly depending on which group controls the 
relevant positions of state authority.  Alternatively, most of the members of a society may share a 
wide range of beliefs and values but will hold differing attitudes on an important subset of issues.  
Either way, it may be necessary to identify the relevant cleavages and to consider the policy 
process in order to achieve a satisfactory account of state behavior. 
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 Where a single political culture can be said to exist, and especially where it is detailed, 
comprehensive, and internally consistent, however, it may exert a strong influence over and thus 
offer a parsimonious explanation of important aspects of foreign and security policy.  Even if 
there is no comprehensive political culture, moreover, those aspects of relevance to external state 
behavior may be homogeneous.  And even where attitudinal differences go further, political 
culture may nevertheless place distinct limits on the range of state actions that can be imagined 
and legitimately discussed.  In any case, whether or not a single political culture exists in a given 
society must be determined empirically and should not simply be assumed. 
  
 Political Culture and German Security Policy after Unification 
 
 The remainder of the paper seeks to illustrate the usefulness of the political culture 
approach by applying it to the case of German security policy after unification.  Two general 
tasks must be accomplished.  The first is to determine whether Germans indeed share a distinct 
political culture that is of potential relevance to national security policy and, if so, to specify 
what that culture is.  The second task is to ascertain whether such a political culture has plausibly 
had a notable impact on German security policy since 1990. 
 Specifying a country’s political culture requires in turn that the investigator answer three 
questions.  How should political culture be dimensionalized into one or more discrete elements 
that can be represented as operationalizable variables?72  Where should one look for evidence of 
the existence and content of a political culture?  And how should the values of the components of 
political culture that are of interest be established?  This analysis seeks to locate German political 
culture on two particularly important dimensions along which attitudes regarding the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of alternative policies can vary: militarism--anti-militarism and 
unilateralism--multilateralism.  It pays particular, although not exclusive, attention to the relevant 
beliefs and values of German political and administrative elites.  And it draws inferences about 
these elite attitudes from a wide variety of sources, including official documents, public 
statements, press reports, independent analyses, and confidential interviews.  As for the second 
task, that of discerning the behavioral impact of political culture, the paper places primary 
emphasis on what Alexander George has termed the "congruence" procedure, which involves 
looking for a logical correspondence between the dependent and independent variables.  These 
methodological choices are explained in the Appendix. 
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German Political Culture in the 1990s 
 
 Following this approach, I have found that German society as a whole, and German 
political elites in particular, can be characterized as possessing a distinctive, widely-shared, and 
rather elaborate set of beliefs and values of potentially great relevance to foreign and national 
security policy.73  These attitudes were shaped primarily by two sets of historical experiences.  
The first was the traumatic and ultimately disastrous experience of the Nazi dictatorship and 
World War II.  These events discredited much of Germany's previous political culture and 
increased German receptiveness to alternative beliefs and values.  Also important was the 
generally successful and thus positive foreign policy experience of the postwar years, including 
the German experience with international institutions, which reinforced the newly dominant 
political orientation that was emerging.74 
 Some observers have wondered whether the end of the cold war and the sudden 
incorporation of 16 million former East Germans into the Federal Republic might significantly 
alter or fragment German political culture.  Certainly, eastern and western German public 
opinion on a variety of core security issues has been marked by notable differences, especially in 
the first years after unification.75  The significance of these differences should not be 
exaggerated, however.  Former East Germans constitute only 20 percent of the population of 
united Germany, and their actual influence on security policy has been and is likely to remain 
disproportionately smaller, at least in the medium term. For the time being, moreover, eastern 
Germans have shown relatively little interest in matters of foreign policy and national security, 
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since, on the whole, they have been "more concerned with everyday issues."76  Thus unification 
has had and is likely to have little impact on those aspects of German political culture that are of 
relevance to external state behavior.77  To the contrary, the peaceful end to the division of 
Germany may have affirmed and reinforced them by seemingly vindicating and rewarding 
postwar policy principles and practices. 
 
Anti-militarism 
 
 Where then does German political culture fall along the dimensions of militarism--anti-
militarism and unilateralism--multilateralism?  One of the most striking aspects of German 
political culture concerns the military and the use force.  Since World War II, anti-militarism and 
even pacifism have acquired strong roots in Germany.78  Well before unification took place, most 
Germans exhibited a "reluctance or, depending on the political camp, an open refusal to consider 
military means as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy."79  Indeed, a not insignificant 
number of Germans have been inclined to consider peace an absolute value, rejecting the use of 
force even to safeguard or restore other political goals such as justice or international law.80  
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These normative views have been reinforced by shared beliefs about the disutility of force.  
Many Germans have tended to see only the disadvantages and inefficacy of military action, 
viewing it as risky and even counterproductive, especially in the absence of a political strategy 
for achieving a lasting solution to the situation at hand.81   Although such sentiments moderated 
somewhat in the 1990s in light of the qualified successes achieved by multilateral military 
interventions intended to contain and prevent ethnic conflict, especially in the Balkans, Germans 
continued to regard the direct application of force as a very last resort, one to be employed only 
in the most compelling circumstances, such as a looming humanitarian catastrophe, and when all 
other means had proved inadequate.82 
 Consequently, it long ago became conventional wisdom that the functions of the German 
armed forces, the Bundeswehr, should be limited almost exclusively to national self-defense and 
that Germany should never again develop a significant power projection capability.83  This 
highly restrictive view of Germany's military role, sometimes characterized as an "obliviousness 
to power,"84 has been little modified since unification, the principal departure being a new 
willingness to contribute forces to international peace missions as long as doing so involves little 
or no risk of combat.  Instead, "Germany maintains a strong preference for economic, political, 
and diplomatic instruments, arms control, and dispute settlement as the preferred means of 
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security policy."85  Not surprisingly, non-military instruments have been widely seen as more 
effective than the use of force, a view that may even have been reinforced by the experience of 
unification.86 
 Closely related to these attitudes toward the use of force have been deep-seated fears of 
the potentially pernicious domestic effects of militarism and a consequent distrust of military 
institutions.  Many Germans have continued to be concerned about a possible renewal of military 
domination of national security decision making, as occurred during the time of the Prussian 
General Staff.  Likewise, they have been wary of the emergence of a professional army that 
could once again become "a state within the state" that was largely unaccountable to political 
authorities, as took place during the interwar years.87  Consequently, most Germans have felt that 
as long as the Federal Republic must maintain armed forces, they must be integrated into 
German society to the greatest possible extent.88 
 
Multilateralism 
 
 Another important set of widely-shared norms that are rooted in Germany's recent past 
help to locate German political culture along the dimension of unilateralism--multilateralism.  
Here, a leading imperative has been to avoid acting alone (Alleingänge) or pursuing a special 
path (Sonderweg).  Germans have exhibited a strong distaste for, even an abhorrence of, 
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unilateralism.  Such sentiments have been expressed by virtually all German political leaders.89  
This norm as well has been reinforced by commonly held cause-effect beliefs.  German leaders 
have feared the consequences of unilateralism, believing that it can only lead to diplomatic 
isolation, insecurity, and conflict.90  
 The previous German penchant for nationalism and unilateralism has been supplanted by 
a degree of support for international cooperation and even integration, involving the sacrifice of 
national prerogatives, that is unparalleled.91  German leaders have greatly preferred pursuing 
Germany's national interests in close cooperation with other countries over acting alone.92  To be 
sure, multilateralism and integration have also been viewed as serving concrete Germany 
objectives.93  They are useful for reassuring Germany's neighbors, and they are essential for 
avoiding diplomatic isolation and future conflicts.  Indeed, they may be the only way to address 
some foreign and security policy concerns.94  But multilateralism has not been embraced only for 
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instrumental purposes.  For many German leaders, it has become a leading goal in and of itself.95 
 A direct corollary of German multilateralism is the importance German political elites 
have attached to international institutions.  German leaders have constantly emphasized the need 
for Germany to work through and to be anchored firmly within the structures of international 
cooperation, be they transatlantic, West European, pan-European, or global.96  At the same time, 
they have been strongly inclined to abide by the rules that these institutions often embody.  This 
approach, which served Germany so well during the postwar era, has been viewed as being of 
continued relevance to German policy for the indefinite future.97 
 Also related to the German commitment to multilateralism and international institutions 
has been the tremendous importance that German leaders have attached to Berechenbarkeit, or 
calculability, in foreign policy.98  They have been anxious for their country to be perceived as a 
reliable, predictable, dependable partner, a concern that they frequently and openly articulate.99  
This imperative "has created a presumption against any government reneging upon, let alone 
renouncing, the basic substance of established foreign-policy commitments."100  Not to fulfill 
Germany's international obligations and responsibilities would undermine the country's 
credibility in the eyes of its partners.  Thus stability and continuity in German security policy 
have become leading normative guidelines in their own right. 
                                                 
95See also Joffe 1991, 4; Müller 1992, 162; and Schlör 1993, 6-7. 
96Morgan 1990, 149; Stent 1990-91, 69; Müller 1992, 162; Anderson and Goodman 1993, 24 and 
60-61; Kelleher and Fisher 1994, 170-71; and Zeit, 21 September 1990, 1. 
97Kohl 1993a, 610.  See also Asmus 1991, vii, and Linnenkamp 1992, 94. 
98Schweigler 1984, 86-88; Clemens 1989, 242-43; Müller 1992, 161; and Pond 1996, 25. 
99Kohl 1993b, 1102; Kohl 1994, 330; Kohl 1996, 167; Klaus Kinkel in The Week in Germany, 
22 May 1992, 1; SPD 1993, 8; and Schröder 1999. 
100Clemens 1989, 242-43. 
  
 The widely shared nature of these norms and beliefs has had important potential 
implications for German state behavior.  In particular, it has formed the basis for a high degree of 
consensus since unification on many basic issues of national security policy.  Few if any 
discernible differences have existed among the ministries and offices of the federal government 
with responsibilities in this area, including the German military, a situation that suggests the 
inapplicability of the organizational culture approach.101  More importantly, this consensus has 
been shared by elites located across most of the political spectrum.  Thus prior to the federal 
elections of 1994 and 1998, leaders of the opposition of Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
expressed satisfaction with the fundamental orientation of the government’s policy, helping to 
ensure that national security was perhaps the least disputed issue in either campaign.102 
 
The Impact of German Political Culture on German Security Policy 
 
 What impact has German political culture in fact had on German state behavior since 
1990?  This section examines the influence of political culture on three main areas of Germany’s 
security policy after unification: its policy toward Europe's security institutions, the 
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transformation of the Bundeswehr, and German responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts.103  I 
show that, whereas many German actions appear problematic when viewed through a neorealist 
lens, they are highly consistent with the content of German political culture.104 
 
German Policy toward European Security Institutions 
 
 One area in which German political culture appears to have had a noteworthy impact has 
been German policy toward the various institutions of European security.  Since unification and 
the end of the cold war, Germany has continued to devise and execute its security policy almost 
entirely in cooperation with others and within the context of international institutions.  Indeed, 
Germany, more than most other European countries, has vigorously sought to maintain, 
strengthen, and adapt wherever possible the regional security institutions that arose during the 
cold war -- and, in some cases, to develop new ones.105 
 Above all, Germany's commitment to NATO, which many doubted at the time of 
unification, has not wavered.  Rather, German leaders from across the political spectrum have 
repeatedly expressed their support for the alliance and the continued presence of allied forces on 
German soil.106  German forces have remained firmly integrated into the alliance's military 
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planning and command structure.107  And Germany has been a leading participant in the process 
of adapting NATO to the new European security environment, which has included furthering the 
degree of military integration in the alliance.108 
 At the same time, Germany has been at the forefront of recent efforts to create a West 
European security and defense identity (ESDI).  Jointly with France, it proposed that the 
European Community develop a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), provisions for 
which were included in the Treaty on European Union approved at Maastricht in late 1991.109  
Since unification, moreover, it has worked to increase the mandate and operational capacities of 
the WEU and to bring that body within the framework of the European Union where it could 
implement defense-related aspects of the CFSP.110  And in 1992, Germany and France elaborated 
plans to expand the existing Franco-German brigade into an integrated "Eurocorps," which other 
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WEU members were invited to join.111  These efforts to give the ESDI a stronger profile 
continued unabated through the 1990s.112 
 Finally, German policy has emphasized involving the reform states of Central and 
Eastern Europe in broader institutional security frameworks that include Germany's Western 
allies rather than establishing new bilateral security ties with the former.  Germany has been a 
principal architect of the many initiatives intended to strengthen the pan-European Conference 
on (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe.113  It was Germany, along with 
the United States, that proposed in 1991 the creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) that would include the former Warsaw Pact states.114  Subsequently, German leaders 
have worked to strengthen further NATO and WEU links with their country's eastern neighbors 
and have advocated that these bodies be open to new members, although they have been quick to 
caution that enlargement should not be allowed to weaken the alliances or strain unduly relations 
with Russia.115 
 Germany's strong support for European security institutions after unification is clearly 
difficult to reconcile with the tenets of neorealism.  In particular, it clashes with the common 
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neorealist assumption that states will seek to maximize their autonomy and avoid external ties 
wherever possible, especially in view of the Federal Republic's much greater potential freedom 
of action following the end of the cold war.  Even if neorealism could explain Germany’s 
continued involvement in one body or another, it would have great difficulty accounting for the 
fact that Germany has championed so many different institutional forms simultaneously.  This 
across-the-board approach has sometimes been dysfunctional, as when it has provoked sharp 
criticism by Germany's partners.116  German behavior in this regard also stands in contrast to the 
policies of the other major West European states, which have been much more selective in their 
support for the various alternative security arrangements.117 
 Instead, this record is much less problematic when viewed in the context of Germany's 
distinct political culture, especially the pronounced aversion to unilateralism, the equally strong 
instinctive preference for international cooperation and multilateralism, and the desire to be 
perceived as a reliable partner that most Germans have shared.  These deeply-held attitudes have 
inclined German leaders to place considerable intrinsic value on European security institutions 
independently of any careful cost-benefit calculations.  They help to explain why German 
officials have seen no inherent contradictions in promoting all of the major regional bodies 
simultaneously and thus why they have underestimated the possible conflicts in such an 
approach.  Instead, the importance of creating, maintaining, and strengthening such institutions 
wherever the opportunity to do so exists has been virtually an article of faith among the German 
political elite.118 
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The Transformation of the Bundeswehr 
 
 A second area in which German political culture has arguably had a noticeable impact 
has been in the German armed forces.  Since 1990, the Bundeswehr has been profoundly 
transformed.  Not only have the armed forces been reduced in size by nearly one-third from their 
cold war maximum -- and by as much as one-half if those of the former German Democratic 
Republic are included -- but they have been fundamentally restructured.  Whereas, during the 
cold war, virtually all regular Bundeswehr units were maintained at a high level of readiness, the 
majority are now heavily dependent upon mobilization.119  These developments can be 
understood largely as a logical consequence, from a neorealist perspective, of Germany's altered 
strategic circumstances, especially the sharp decline in the immediate military threat. 
 Despite the magnitude of these changes, however, the Bundeswehr has failed to adapt 
optimally to the new strategic environment in at least two respects.  First, the German 
government has made only limited progress toward the development of new national capabilities 
for exercising operational control of the German armed forces in situations, chiefly UN missions 
beyond NATO territory, in which they would have to operate outside of the alliance structures on 
which the Federal Republic has traditionally relied.120  Second, the government has steadfastly 
refused to abandon male conscription (Wehrpflicht) despite its increasing dysfunctionality.  As a 
result of the end of the cold war, both the the military usefulness and the political legitimacy of 
conscription have been regularly called into question, and not only in Germany.  Even France, 
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which invented the modern levée en masse, decided in 1996 to follow the lead of alliance 
partners such as Belgium and the Netherlands in moving to create a professional army, leaving 
Germany alone among the major Western powers as a practitioner of compulsory military 
service.121 
 Although troublesome from a neorealist perspective, both of these examples of 
maladjustment can be readily understood in terms of Germany's postwar political culture, 
especially the strong strand of anti-militarism that it contains.122  On the one hand, anti-
militarism has lain at the root of widespread popular and, to a lesser extent, elite concerns about 
the possible reconstitution of a German General Staff that might be unaccountable to German 
political authorities.123  Consequently, the government has been forced to proceed with caution in 
its efforts to enhance Germany's planning and command capabilities, even though such 
improvements have been necessitated in large part by Germany's multilateral commitments.124 
 On the other hand, anti-militarism has fostered, somewhat paradoxically, a strong, if not 
universal, attachment to conscription, despite its disadvantages in the circumstances of the post-
cold war era.  Compulsory military service, elites from across the political spectrum have 
believed, remains an indispensable link between the Bundeswehr and the German people,125 even 
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though an increasing number of commentators have observed that Germany had nothing to fear 
from a professional army.126  These attitudes have ensured that conscription would be preserved 
in Germany, even as its neighbors moved to abandon the draft. 
 
German Responses to Out-of-Area Crises and Conflicts 
 
 A third major area of German security policy in which German political culture appears 
to have exerted considerable influence has been the country's responses to out-of-area crises and 
conflicts since unification.  During the cold war, the German armed forces had one overriding 
military mission: to deter and, if necessary, to defend against a potentially large-scale, Soviet-led 
Warsaw Pact attack on Germany launched with little or no warning.127  Almost all military 
planning and resources were devoted to this primary contingency.  Virtually no thought was 
given to using the Bundeswehr outside of the NATO area or even to defending NATO allies 
other than Germany's immediate neighbors.128 
 Since 1990, however, Germany has been confronted with a series of international crises 
and conflicts that have demanded a German response.  Not only have some of these, especially 
the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, threatened to affect Germany directly, but the country has 
repeatedly come under pressure from the United Nations and its allies to contribute to a wide 
variety of international actions outside the NATO area intended to keep or restore the peace.  
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Unlike during the cold war, Germany has no longer been granted the option of remaining aloof 
from such out-of-area operations in order to concentrate on the defense of its own territory. 
 Nevertheless, Germany's response to these challenges has been decidedly equivocal.  On 
the one hand, an important shift in German security policy has taken place.  Since 1991, 
Germany has gradually expanded the nature and scope of its involvement in international 
military operations intended to preserve or restore peace.  Bundeswehr units have been 
dispatched to locations as diverse as the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Somalia, and the Balkans.  
Perhaps most striking is the contrast between the tentativeness with which Germany joined the 
forces monitoring the UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and its unhesitating 
assumption of an equal role in the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia four years later.  
Largely as a result of these actions, a number of observers have spoken of a "normalization" of 
German foreign and security policy.129 
 On the other hand, Germany's assumption of a growing international military role has 
been consistently marked by substantial reservations and numerous limitations.  Germany has 
not always offered to make a military contribution to international peace missions, and at other 
times, it has done so only after considerable debate and with great ambivalence.  Moreover, 
where German forces have deployed outside the NATO area, they have done so only in relatively 
small numbers, and they have been restricted almost exclusively to roles that have involved no 
risk of combat.130 
 One cause of this mixed record, at least for the first four years after unification, was the 
prevailing interpretation of the German Basic Law, which was widely viewed as permitting the 
armed forces to be used, apart from humanitarian missions, only for the defense of Germany 
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itself and its allies.131  Consequently, even those political leaders who favored making a more 
substantial military contribution to international peace missions were obliged to limit their 
advocacy to actions that were not clearly inconsistent with these highly constraining guidelines.  
The German government sought to cloak most proposed deployments in the guise of 
humanitarian assistance, and Bundeswehr missions clearly at odds with the restrictive 
constitutional interpretation were assiduously avoided. 
 Nevertheless, even the more active responses that government officials would have 
preferred to make were typically less forceful and less substantial than Germany's partners would 
have wished.  And even the lifting of the alleged constitutional restraints in July 1994 failed to 
produce any profound reorientation of German policy.  To the contrary, it has remained 
circumscribed by clear criteria that are unusual for a country of Germany's size and overall 
importance in world affairs and that, in any case, have virtually ensured that German 
involvement in military operations beyond national and alliance defense would indeed be 
infrequent.  In fact, German leaders have stressed that their country's contributions to 
international efforts to promote peace would continue to be primarily of a political and economic 
nature.132  Thus when confronted with a series of allied requests in late 1994 and 1995 to 
contribute forces to the international efforts to bring peace to Bosnia, Germany responded with 
some hesitation and imposed numerous conditions on its involvement.133  And even the much 
less qualified nature of the Federal Republic’s contribution to the NATO Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) in Bosnia since the end of 1996, which for the first time allowed the Bundeswehr to 
participate as an equal partner, can be attributed far more to the modesty of its size, the low level 
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of risk involved, and its primarily non-combat purposes than to any fundamental change of 
attitude. 
 Instead, the pattern of German responses to out-of-area crises and conflicts can be fully 
understood only if one considers German political culture.  On the one hand, the "culture of 
reticence" has inclined many German political leaders to proceed slowly and cautiously, 
especially on such a controversial and potentially explosive issue.134  At the same time, as a 
result of the anti-militarist attitudes that have taken root in Germany since World War II, German 
leaders from across the political spectrum have insisted that attempts to find peaceful solutions to 
international conflicts must be given absolute priority, while military means should be employed 
only as a last resort, if at all.  Likewise, they have generally been skeptical about the utility of 
military force and equally optimistic about the possibility of resolving conflicts through peaceful 
means.135 
 On the other hand, these inhibitions have been counteracted by other strands in German 
political culture, which have provided powerful motives for assuming a larger, if still qualified, 
military role.  In particular, the inherent German reluctance to participate in international military 
operations has collided with the strong German commitment to multilateralism and the 
concomitant rejection of ever pursuing a separate path.  It has also conflicted with the imperative 
to be a reliable partner.  Not to join with Germany's allies and partners would smack of 
unilateralism, harm its international reputation, and risk leading to isolation.  In short, the norms 
embedded in German political culture, which were mutually reinforcing during the cold war, 
have offered contradictory prescriptions for how to respond to out-of-area crises and conflicts 
since unification.  As a result, and in marked contrast to the other two aspects of German policy 
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considered above, German political leaders have consistently had to struggle to find the least 
unsatisfactory compromise between opposing normative dictates. 
 The principal exception to Germany's record of cautious and limited responses that one 
might cite consists of its efforts in late 1991 to secure the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and 
Croatia.136  Yet even this episode did not represent nearly as sharp a departure in German policy 
as it has commonly been portrayed.  Although the German government asserted itself more than 
on any previous or subsequent occasion, it faced an unusually strong combination of pressures to 
act, and its behavior was still marked by clear limits that were consistent with German political 
culture.  German leaders went to great lengths to work through multilateral channels in order to 
achieve an end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, and German diplomacy toward the 
conflict was equally notable for its complete lack of military backing.  Subsequent to the 
recognition decision, moreover, German policy assumed a much lower profile, with German 
leaders regularly deferring to their Western counterparts on important issues.137 
 Of course, any invocation of German political culture tends to obscure the domestic 
divisions that have marked the attitudes of German political elites on the out-of-area question.  
Where the various strands of German political culture have come into conflict with one another, 
different elite factions have hewn more strongly to one strand than another, resulting in what 
Harald Müller has described as the deepest rift on a foreign policy issue since the debate over 
Ostpolitik rent the Federal Republic in the early 1970s.138  As a general rule, members of the 
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Union139 and Free Democratic Party (FDP) have been influenced most of all by multilateralist 
sentiments and have stressed the importance of showing solidarity with Germany's allies and the 
international community, assuming greater responsibility, being a reliable partner, and avoiding 
Germany's isolation.  Meanwhile, members of the SPD and Green party have been motivated 
primary by anti-militarist convictions and thus have emphasized limiting Germany's military 
role.  At times, however, even the government and the parties themselves have been divided. 
 Yet one should not make too much of these disputes.  In particular, they do not 
necessarily point to the existence of distinct political subcultures.  Rather, they are better 
understood as the product of differences of emphasis rather than of irreconcilable positions.  
Thus neither major faction has repudiated the values held most dearly by the other.  Although 
few if any members of the Union and the FDP have counted themselves among Germany's many 
pacifists, they have by and large shared the strong postwar German aversion to reliance on the 
use of force.  Conversely, most members of the SPD and the Greens have been loath to see 
Germany pursue a separate path.  In other words, one can discern a single German political 
culture that has placed distinct boundaries on the discourse employed by German political 
leaders and that has clearly proscribed some theoretically possible policy responses. 
 Nevertheless, the installation of an SDP-Green coalition government in the fall of 1998 
inevitably raised questions about the future direction of German security policy.  Earlier in the 
decade, the Green party had advocated German withdrawal from NATO, it had called for the 
abolition of conscription and the eventually dissolution of the Bundeswehr, and it had opposed 
German participation in any out-of-area military missions, including UN peacekeeping 
operations.  Over time, however, the official position of the party on these issues and especially 
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the views of members of the pragmatic Realo wing of the party have steadily moderated.140  In 
the area of national security, moreover, the coalition agreement hammered out by the two parties 
clearly bore the stamp of the more centrist SPD.141  And as 1998 drew to a close, the coalition 
had announced no significant policy changes.  To the contrary, the new government had 
expressed strong support for NATO even as it sought to reform aspects of the alliance, it had 
deferred any fundamental restructuring of the Bundeswehr for at least two years, and it had 
approved limited German participation in possible NATO military actions, should they become 
unavoidable, in Kosovo. 
 Through the first months of the NATO air campaign against Serbia the following spring, 
moreover, SPD and Green leaders sought to strike a careful balance between the contending 
demands of multilateralism and anti-militarism.  On the one hand, the government strongly 
endorsed the alliance policy of using airstrikes to compel Serbia to withdraw its military and 
police forces from Kosovo.  On the other hand, Germany largely limited its own involvement to 
the contribution of 14 aircraft intended to provide reconnaissance and to defend NATO bombers 
against Serb air defenses while playing a leading role in alliance diplomatic efforts to forge a 
political solution to the crisis that would involve Russia.142 
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Conclusion 
 
 This brief case study offers support for the proposition that political culture can be an 
important source of external state behavior.  I have argued that German political elites have 
shared a set of beliefs and values, or a political culture, of great relevance to national security 
policy and that this political culture appears to have shaped several central aspects of German 
security policy after unification.  In particular, Germany's policy toward European security 
institutions, its efforts to transform the Bundeswehr, and its responses to out-of-area crises and 
conflicts since 1990, although often puzzling from a neorealist perspective, have been highly 
consistent with the content of German political culture.  More generally, this political culture has 
greatly limited the country's potential for unilateral, assertive, and, especially, aggressive 
behavior, placing instead a premium on continuity, stability, and restraint, even as the powerful 
external constraints of the cold war era loosened.  Although political culture alone cannot 
account for all aspects of German security policy, it nevertheless would seem to constitute a 
necessary component of any satisfactory explanation.143 
 In view of the impact that German political culture has had, moreover, a continuation of 
German security policy along the lines laid down in the 1990s seems quite likely well into the 
next century.  While acknowledging the difficulty of making specific predictions, it seems safe to 
say that German policy will continue to be marked by a degree of multilateralism and anti-
militarism that is unusual for a country of Germany’s size and resources.  In particular, one 
should expect to see strong across-the-board support for European security institutions; the 
preservation of conscription notwithstanding its disadvantages; no change in Germany’s limited 
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capacity for independent military action; a willingness to deploy forces abroad only in 
conjunction with other states, especially Germany’s NATO and EU partners, and in the presence 
of an international mandate; and relatively limited levels and forms of participation in such 
multilateral peace missions.  Although not all of these actions would clearly disconfirm 
neorealism, each would be much easier to understand in terms of Germany’s political culture 
than its external environment and relative power position. 
 The findings of this analysis suggest, at a minimum, the value of further research into the 
relationship between political culture and state behavior.  I do not mean to imply that other 
cultural approaches are of little or no relevance.  To the contrary, they can and often must be 
drawn upon in order to account for otherwise puzzling instances of state action or inaction.  The 
concept of global culture is potentially useful for understanding commonalities in the policies of 
states of diverse sizes, locations, and levels of development.  The organizational and strategic 
culture approaches are well-suited for explaining certain aspects of foreign and, especially, 
security policy.  And yet other cultural concepts of value have been advanced.  Of all the 
possible cultural approaches, however, political culture applies to the broadest range of cases and 
thus represents the most useful starting point for the analysis of foreign and security policy. 
 A logical first step in the study of political culture, given the limitations of the existing 
literature, is to conduct additional case studies.  Although German security policy after 
unification is suggestive of the potential influence of political culture, it provides little basis for 
making generalizations about its effects and its relative importance vis-á-vis other possible 
external and internal sources of state behavior.  As we have seen, the case of Germany since 
1990 is characterized by relatively little intertemporal variation in the independent and dependent 
variables.  In addition, Germany is unlikely to be representative of a large number of states, 
given its size, wealth, degree of involvement in the international community, unique historical 
experiences, etc.  Thus there is still a need for more basic evidence concerning the presence or 
  
absence of distinct political cultures, their content, and their effects on the policies of other states 
and during different historical periods.  It makes little sense to engage in cross-national 
comparisons of political culture until its existence and its impact have been established in 
specific instances.144 
 As case studies cumulate, however, scholars should increasingly seek to situate their 
work in an explicitly comparative framework.  Such an approach is necessary to identify the 
range of values that different elements of political culture may hold.  At a minimum, the case of 
postwar Germany suggests that significant departures can occur from a realpolitik strategic 
culture that deems the use of force an effective and legitimate policy instrument.145  In addition, 
comparative analysis will help to establish the nature and magnitude of the effects of political 
culture, both in absolute terms and relative to other possible determinants. 
 Despite its potential usefulness, the concept of political culture has several important 
limitations as an explanation of state behavior that must be acknowledged.  Above, I noted that 
not every society can be characterized as possessing a distinct political culture, that even where a 
distinct political culture can be said to exist, it may offer little or no specific guidance for some 
aspects of foreign and security policy, and that political culture will be of less use for explaining 
specific decisions than for comprehending broad patterns and trends in policy.  As a result, 
political culture will best account for all aspects of a state’s behavior rarely, if ever, and 
invocation of the concept will sometimes not be at all necessary. 
 In addition, one must bear in mind that political culture is not forever fixed.  Although 
often highly stable, it can evolve over time, and it can sometimes be profoundly altered in a 
relatively short period, as evidenced by the transformation that arguably took place as a result of 
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World War II in the German political culture of the first half of the 20th century.  Likewise, one 
should not assume that Germany’s current political culture is immune to change.  To the 
contrary, it is possible to imagine several scenarios in which a singularly hostile international 
environment could force Germany to jettison the post-cold war policies that its elites have 
preferred and, ultimately, could discredit the widely-shared beliefs and values on which those 
policies have been based.146  For example, the re-emergence of an acute military threat in 
combination with the loss of alliance security guarantees could prompt Germany to strengthen its 
conventional forces and even to acquire nuclear weapons.  External pressures of this magnitude 
are, however, highly unlikely.  Indeed, much of current German policy is intended precisely to 
forestall the emergence of such conditions. 
 Nevertheless, these considerations should not obscure a more general point: although 
political culture can often be treated as an independent variable in the study of state behavior, 
analysts must also be attentive to possible temporal variations.  Ultimately, cultural explanations 
should be accompanied by a better understanding of the sources and determinants of culture 
itself, just as structural theories of international relations, such as neorealism, must answer the 
question of how particular international structures arise in the first place. 
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Appendix: Methodological Considerations 
 
Measuring Political Culture 
 
 The concept of political culture, although more restrictive than some cultural variables, is 
still very broad.  It contains a potentially large number of elements.  To attempt to measure all of 
them would demand substantial resources and is, in any case, unnecessary.  Instead, one should 
focus on those aspects of greatest relevance to the type of behavior under investigation.  Of 
course, just what these elements are cannot always be specified in advance, since the content of 
no two cultures is exactly alike.  Rather, it may be advisable in some cases to try to identify them 
empirically rather than imposing an inappropriate conceptual framework. 
 In order to provide some guidance, however, it is useful as a general rule to begin the 
process of describing political culture with a working model of its basic structure in mind, even 
if this is ultimately modified or discarded.  Recent research on the structure of American foreign 
policy beliefs suggests one potentially useful framework with which to start.  This framework 
posits three particularly important dimensions along which beliefs and values regarding the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of alternative policies can vary: isolationism--internationalism, 
militarism--anti-militarism, and unilateralism--multilateralism.147  Because of its history, 
location, and level of economic dependence,  however, unified Germany has had little choice but 
to be deeply engaged in international affairs.  Instead, the principal policy alternatives have 
concerned the nature of that involvement as well as the appropriate geographical scope (regional 
or global) of Germany’s external activities.  Consequently, the empirical discussion addresses 
only the last two dimensions. 
 As for the question of where to look for culture, this analysis pays particular, although 
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not exclusive, attention to the relevant beliefs and values of German political and administrative 
elites.  Robert Putnam has concisely defined the political elite "as those who in any society rank 
toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated) dimensions of interest, involvement, 
and influence in politics."148  This choice of focus offers several advantages over an analysis of 
political culture in German society at large, especially as it may be revealed in public opinion.  
First, elite political culture is typically easier to describe and measure comprehensively, short of 
conducting public opinion polls that are sufficiently elaborate to reveal underlying attitudinal 
structures.  Political elites express their views frequently and often in great detail.  The relative 
abundance of information on elite attitudes, moreover, simplifies the task of measuring political 
culture independently of behavior in order to avoid tautological reasoning. 
 Second, political culture as revealed in the attitudes of elites is likely to be more elaborate 
and detailed.  Political leaders and policy makers often have quite sophisticated and complex 
political belief and value systems, which are also usually more coherent and logically consistent 
than those of ordinary individuals.149  Consequently, elite political culture is more likely to 
contain beliefs and values of relevance to a wide range of foreign and security issues and thus to 
provide meaningful guidance for policy. 
 Third, as suggested by the definition of political elites, elite attitudes are likely to have a 
much more immediate bearing on state behavior than will those of the general public.  It is 
political and administrative elites who are directly responsible for making policy, while members 
of the general public often have little interest in or knowledge about policy issues.  In addition, 
where public opinion is clearly expressed and appears to run counter to what political leaders 
prefer, they may defy it or seek to reshape it, especially in the areas of foreign and security 
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policy.150 
 This is not meant to deny that public opinion can serve as an important constraint on or 
motive force behind policy, as is suggested by the democratic peace literature, or to suggest that 
elite and mass attitudes of relevance to foreign and security policy often diverge.  To the 
contrary, although one must be attentive to the possibility of such differences, the two are 
generally consonant with one another in Germany.  One reason is the leveling and 
homogenization of German society that took place after World War II.  As a result, most 
Germans, including political elites, have undergone highly similarly processes of political 
socialization.  Another reason lies in postwar Germany's political institutions, including its large, 
catch-all political parties and the widespread use of proportional representation.  The attitudes of 
German political elites are unlikely to deviate significantly for long from those of the general 
public, since the electoral process tends to reward those who hold more similar attitudes, or who 
at least act as though they do.151  Instead, elite views are broadly representative of those of 
German society as a whole.152  The main differences are likely to lie in the complexity and 
specificity of elite and mass attitudes rather than in their fundamental orientations. 
 Nevertheless, even an elite focus cannot eliminate -- and may even exacerbate in some 
ways -- the basic methodological difficulty of describing political culture, that of "gaining 
consistent, reliable access to what is inside people's minds."153  What individuals write and say 
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does not always accurately reflect what they actually think.  Indeed, political leaders may have 
more reason than most people to dissimulate or to use communications instrumentally rather than 
to represent their true beliefs and values.154 
 Although this difficulty cannot be definitively resolved, it can be managed in various 
ways.  This study employs several approaches for increasing the validity of its claims about the 
existence and content of German political culture.  First, rather than rely on only one form of 
data or another, I have sought to identify and analyze a wide range of sources of potential 
relevance.  In addition to surveying the available secondary literature on German security policy, 
I have examined many of the public statements and writings of German political leaders and 
drawn upon other available German government and political party documents and 
publications.155  In this way, I have been able to ensure that my sources include the views 
expressed by individuals from a range of political affiliations and before a variety of audiences.  
Should regularities in these views be found where differences might be expected to appear, then 
one can have greater confidence in the validity of one's inferences.156 
 Second, I have checked for consistency between what political elites themselves have 
written and said in potentially instrumental communications and their views as described in 
                                                 
154On the problem of distinguishing between instrumental and representational communications, 
see Shimko 1992, 52-53, and O. Holsti 1976, 43-44. 
155For public statements, I have relied primarily upon Bulletin, which is a quasi-daily 
compilation of important speeches published by the Federal Press and Information Office; the 
occasional series of statements and speeches distributed by the German Information Center in 
New York; and Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, a monthly publication of the Federal Press and 
Information Office that contains a variety of documents on security issues. 
156Risse-Kappen 1995, 41, and Foyle 1997, 148. 
  
relatively objective sources, such as press reports and the analyses of independent experts.157  
Third, I have conducted confidential interviews with German policy makers, party officials, and 
other close observers of German policy making.  These subjects do not represent a random 
sample of all potential interviewees within the German political and administrative elites.  But 
those interviewed were generally representative of the main political parties and the principal 
government agencies responsible for the formulation of German security policy (Table 1).158   
Although not fool-proof, the use of confidentiality, by eliciting more candid responses, should in 
general yield more accurate inferences about the beliefs of interview subjects.  Nevertheless, in 
view of the obvious difficulties associated with the replication of interview-based findings, it 
should be stressed that none of the inferences in this study are based on interview material alone.  
Rather, the interviews have served primarily to corroborate information obtained from public 
sources. 
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
Determining the Impact of Political Culture on State Behavior 
 
 The second general task to be accomplished, that of determining the influence of German 
political culture on German security policy, is complicated by the fact that this paper considers 
only a single case, and then only over a relatively brief time span.  As a result, there is no cross-
                                                 
157For press reports, I have drawn upon the extensive clipping files of the Press Documentation 
Office of the Bundestag and of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation as well as the translations 
contained in the daily reports of the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 
158The principal exception is the absence of interviews with members of the Green party, which 
was not represented in the German parliament at the time the interviews were conducted. 
  
national and little temporal variation in the independent and dependent variables to provide 
analytical leverage.  In such situations, one can make recourse to two basic methods.159  Ideally, 
one would employ what Alexander George has termed the "process-tracing" procedure, which 
involves investigating and explaining the decision process or causal pathways by which various 
initial conditions are translated into outcomes.160 
 Given space constraints, however, this paper places primary emphasis here on what 
George has called the "congruence" procedure.161  By this method, one seeks simply to establish 
whether a correspondence exists between the dependent variable and the types of policy 
outcomes that one would logically expect to find, given the observed values of the various 
independent variables under consideration.  The presence of such a correspondence is a 
necessary, if not sufficient, condition for establishing causality.  Thus the paper attempts to 
establish that several important aspects of German security policy after unification have been 
inconsistent with the expectations generated, or at least not fully explained, by neorealism, while 
being congruent with what consideration of German political culture would lead one to predict. 
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 Table 1 
 Interview Subjects 
 
 German Officials 
 
Government Officials 
 Chancellory     3 
 Foreign Ministry    8 
 Defense Ministry    6 
 German Embassy, Washington, D.C. 4 
 German Mission to NATO, Brussels  3 
 
Political Party Officials 
 Christian Democratic Union (CDU)  2 
 Social Democratic Party (SPD)  4 
 Free Democratic Party (FDP)  4 
 
Officials in Party-affiliated Research Institutes 
 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (CDU)  2 
 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (SPD)  2 
 
  
 Other Interviews 
 
U.S. Government Officials 
 Department of State    2 
 Department of Defense   4 
 U.S. Embassy, Bonn    2 
 U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels  3 
 
NATO Officials     5 
 
Note: Interviews were conducted over a two-year time period spanning two trips to Germany in 
1993 and 1994.  Several individuals were interviewed twice. 
